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ABSTRACT
The case study is concerned with how a long-standing market leader maintains a position of
advantage and develops its business in a fast-moving industry undergoing significant change.
There are many different strategic options open to Barclaycard, but which will be most
suitable? Will all the options be acceptable, not only in terms of the likely risk and returns
but also to the major stakeholders? Will the options be feasible? The case invites readers to
evaluate and compare a range of strategic options and to choose the best way forward for
Barclaycard.3
INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the millennium, Barclaycard was operating in a sophisticated and highly
competitive industry. The company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Barclays Plc, aimed
to provide the plastic card infrastructure for Barclays Bank and was responsible for
producing, issuing and replacing all  Barclay's plastic cards. It also managed directly all
customer relationships for Barclay's plastic card services in the UK (a range of  services
which is described below). Through its Global Services Division, Barclaycard had a
commitment to extending the Barclaycard brand and services across the world providing
card acceptance services to many countries, predominantly on the African continent, Middle
East, Caribbean and in a few countries in South America.
By 1999 Barclaycard had over 9 million customers and employed over 5,000 people at
three locations around the country and its Northampton headquarters. Barclaycard was
accepted at over 400,000 places in the UK and more than 12 million worldwide. In what
follows the case describes the milestones in the growth of the credit card market, including
developments which associate with new information technology (IT) applications. As a
result readers should be able to tell whether and how Barclaycard can stay ahead.
THE ORIGINS OF CREDIT CARDS AND BARCLAYCARD
Credit cards emerged in the first half of the 20
th Century and initially cards were used as a
way to simplify the process of identification and confirmation of customers when tellers
required authorisation for account purchases in retail stores. The process developed and in
the 1940’s a number of US banks allowed customers to charge purchases against their
monthly bank charge account rather than to a store account. In 1950 Diners Club launched
a Travel and Entertainment ( T&E) card, an innovation that which also led to the
establishment of American Express and, separately, Carte Blanche. The issuer of the T&E
card would settle the bills from hotels, restaurants or airlines and reclaim payment from the
member. The T&E card, therefore, provided settlement in arrears but no rollover credit
while additional revenue for the issuer generated from annual fees from customers and
charging a commission on sales to the merchant.4
It was around this time when the Franklin National Bank (based in New York) developed
what is recognised as the originator of the first real credit card. This innovation considered
offering rollover credit up to an authorised credit limit. Furthermore, managers at Franklin
National Bank also recognised the competitive potential of credit cards by being the first to
issue credit cards to customers of other banks. However, the localised nature of branch
banking in the US meant cards were only useful in the limited area served by the issuing
bank, an inconvenience to an increasingly mobile population. Nevertheless, a franchising
system developed under which banks acquired the right to issue branded cards in a
particular city that customers could use with both collaborating merchants locally and out of
state. In 1958 Bank of America, with the advantage of its huge West Coast network,
launched the blue, white and gold BankAmericard. By 1965 Bank of America was realising
the brand value of its heavily promoted card by actively franchising other banks to issue its
card and recruit merchants. In this way the network provided BankAmericard cardholders
with a national (and eventually international) network of service points which was to provide
the foundation for the future Visa network.
Barclays Bank was the first UK bank to recognise the potential of the credit card.  After
evaluating  BankAmericard’s operations in the US they negotiated a franchise from
BankAmerica at the end of 1965.  A small team was set up to plan a UK launch six months
later under the brand Barclaycard and by launch date 30,000 retailers had been signed up.
Early promises to retailers to publish the name and address of every shop accepting
Barclaycard led to what is still believed to be one of the largest ever press advertisements. It
appeared in the Daily Mail on 29 June 1966, extended over eight pages and carried all the
30,000 names and addresses of retailers. Successful acceptance by the British adult
population meant that by the end of 1966 Barclays Bank had passed the milestone of 1
million Barclaycard holders.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION
Early contenders to both Visa and Barclaycard emerged from their closest competitors. In
1966, prompted by the success of the BankAmericard network members of competing
franchises formed the Interbank Card Association (ICA), later to become MasterCard5
International.  ICA differed from  BankAmericard in being an association controlled by
member banks which took responsibility for promoting the MasterCard brand and for
setting standards for security and authorisation, clearing and settlement systems between
members. ICA went international in 1968 with an association with  Banamex (Mexico’s
biggest bank in terms of assets), an alliance in Europe with Eurocard, and the recruitment of
member banks from Japan. A comparable organisation, National BankAmericard, Inc. was
formed by US banks issuing BankAmericards in 1970. Later on, what was to become Visa
International was formed by Bank of America's international licensees while, in parallel, ICA
rebranded as MasterCard International and then as Mastercard. At this point the two card
systems that between them would preside over the world credit card market for the
following thirty years were in place. As open membership organisations they provided a
common framework giving banks (and in due course non-banks) access to what turned out
to be easily the most profitable and fastest growing product in the portfolio of most retail
banks.
Along side the creation of two international networks and conscious of the strong position
Barclaycard had created in the fast growing UK card market, the other major UK
commercial banks decided they would collaborate to reduce the risks of launching a rival
card. In 1972, National Westminster (NatWest), Lloyds, Midland and the Royal Bank of
Scotland/Williams & Glyn’s Group established the Joint Credit Card Company Limited
(JCCC). Trading began using the Access brand and after merchants had been recruited, a
computer programme purchased from the US (which was extensively rewritten for Access
purposes) and IBM equipment had been installed to process payments. At the same time,
Access was aligned with the network of banks that would eventually become Mastercard in
the UK.
Unlike the T&E card, bank credit card usage expanded rapidly in the UK and elsewhere.
For instance, between September 1967 and January 1972 growth in the US resulted in an
increase of 680% in the number of banks with credit card facilities. In the UK, within a year
of launching the Access group had 3.3 million cardholders and 65,000 retail or merchant
outlets. That same year, Barclaycard had 1.7 million cardholders and was accepted in
60,000 merchant outlets (but this growth took place while Barclays acted as sole card-6
issuer and sole merchant-acquirer for its network). In comparison and in spite of the T&E
card having been introduced earlier than the bank credit card, the combination of Diners
Club and American Express had only 550,000 cardholders in 1979.
During the late 1960s and 1970s, therefore, a period of intense competition between Visa
and Mastercard and between individual holders of each franchise to sign up merchants
ensued, this against a background of an annual increase in credit card ownership of more
than 20%.  Apart from grocery chains and other outlets where purchase values were low,
acceptance of both Barclaycard/Visa and Access/Mastercard became universal, in part
reflecting banks’ reluctance to increase cheque guarantees above £50 pounds.
In subsequent years the demand for credit cards exploded. At the same  time  outlets
(merchants) were recruited by both networks, merchants began accepting American
Express and Diners Club cards, while the right to issue Visa cards extended to an increasing
range of bank and non-bank competitors. Moreover, duality whereby banks could join both
Visa and Mastercard networks became possible in 1988 with the banks able to issue both
cards. But bylaws of each group prevented their members from issuing the cards of third
parties such as American Express or Discover, a practice that was challenged in the US by
both the Federal government and a powerful group of retailers at the end of the 1990s. In
any event, duality further enhanced the potential for scale economies since banks could
process all the Visa and MasterCard transactions of their merchants.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Barclays responded using heavy promotion and branding to
retain the position of Barclaycard as market leader. This position of advantage in the UK
was maintained with success and represented servicing around 9 million credit card
customers in 1999.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Excluding marketing costs Barclays initial investment in the Bank of America franchise was
low. Managers at Barclaycard were able to migrate the entire operation from the US,
including computer programs, terms and conditions of service to both retailers and
cardholders. However, minor modifications to the Bank of America computer programme
were required for UK purposes. Says a senior executive at Barclaycard,7
“From Barclaycard’s viewpoint, it envisaged that the complexities of adopting a US
system for UK use were for example integration with feeder systems for capturing
voucher details, customer payments (as the US had a radically different banking
system), authorization (which was then an intense manual process), Country Club
Billing (where individual  transaction slips were matched and sent out with the
statement) and  address formats/postcodes which were very different from the
United States model.”
Although some customisation was required, the original system (like its paper or cardboard
based predecessors), relied primarily on carbonless duplicate paper vouchers imprinted with
details embossed on the customer’s plastic card. Credit control was then managed using
floor (merchant) limits combined with telephone authorisation.
Growth in card usage convinced Barclaycard that automation through a fully computer-
based transaction system was required and one was commissioned in 1974 to eliminate
much of the paperwork, speed up the authorisation process and provide narrative
statements for cardholders. This need to accelerate service delivery time eventually led to
the formation of a platform for “real time” operations. In other words, an array of IT
applications that allowed automatic credit authorisation and funds transfer to the merchant’s
bank using extensive communications networks to link Visa’s and Mastercard’s electronic
fund transfer protocols as well as their 24-hour-a-day and 7-day-a-week credit
authorisation systems.
Alongside development in credit card markets, one could find that banks had been issuing
cash card/cheque guarantee cards to their customers and installing networks of automated
teller machines (ATM) to lower the costs of delivering basic bank services. Barclays Bank
led the world with the first operational ATM in 1967 while IBM introduced the magnetic
stripe plastic cards in 1969. Together these innovations marked the birth of electronic
banking. Bank systems then developed to implement “real time” transactions through
ATM’s and these were equivalent to the transactions required to transfer funds from the
credit balances of credit cardholders to transacting merchants.
Barclay’s early adoption of ATM’s was no coincidence because cash withdrawal through
ATMs is a major use for credit cards. Initially, the heavy investment required to build an8
ATM’s network was seen as a major source of competitive advantage for large banks so
interconnection was slow to develop. But after 30 years the absurdity of terminals
connected to different networks located side by side and long after terminal density had
reached saturation point, eventually resulted in a single interconnected network in 1999 for
the UK. Competitive to the end, Barclays then announced that it would charge non-
customers heavily for using its machines, a proposal it had to withdraw after being vilified in
the press.
Given the slowness with which banks integrated their networks it was not surprising that
Visa and  Mastercard standards were adopted for debit cards.  Debit cards provide
instantaneous transfer of funds from the cardholder’s account to the transacting merchant or
cash issuing bank and in the UK banks were again split between the Switch and Delta
formats (Visa Delta was re-branded in due course as Visa Debit). Debit cards were a new
source of growth for card issuing banks during the late-1980s to the extent that in 1991
MasterCard, with partner Europay International, launched their global online direct debit
system to provide immediate transfers from customers’ accounts against transactions
(Maestro). Shortly after that a system to support direct debit for ATM cash withdrawal
world wide (MasterCard/Cirrus network) was developed.
In summary, developments in the 35 years that followed the launch of credit cards in the UK
by Barclaycard have been marked by a continuing move to industry standards,
interconnecting and interoperating hardware and software, and overlapping membership of
the two technology platforms (i.e. Visa International and Mastercard), as well as by almost
identical functionality between cards. Barclaycard’s achievement over this period was that it
retained the advantage gained through early entry and remained as market leader, not just
with the basic credit cards but in most of the segments that evolved in the market.  From
scratch Barclaycard grew to be the largest credit card business in Europe, with a presence
in UK and elsewhere, including Germany, France and Spain.
CARD PROFITABILITY
Figure 1 summarises the revenue streams from cards and these comprise four potential
sources of income:9
Annual fees charged to cardholders.
Interest charges on customer balances outstanding beyond the free credit period.
Merchant commissions and handling charges.
Processing charges recovered through contracts to non-processing card issuers.
[Insert figure 1 around here]
Despite being the initial and for a considerable period the only credit card issuer in the UK,
Barclaycard made losses for the first decade of its operations as it built up its card and
merchant volumes.  As the market leader it consistently priced Barclaycard at a premium,
charging an annual card fee as well as the highest interest rate on credit card debt (annual
percentage rate or APR) in the market.  To sustain this position management invested
heavily in marketing to the point at which Barclaycard was the most recognised financial
brand in the UK. Shaun  Powell, a commercial director of Barclaycard until 1997 was
typically opposed to anything that would dilute Barclaycard’s brand:
‘…branding is a discipline, it is all about sustaining your premium price.’
The financial summary for the performance of Barclaycard during 18 months of trading is
summarised in table 1. These figures illustrate that cards deliver a high proportion of non-
interest income and are therefore attractive to banks who have to provide regulatory capital
to back interest bearing assets.  Actually, the growth of credit cards has been part of the
reason why both international and British banks have been able to more than double the
proportion of their income earned as fees and commissions over the last 30 years.
Table 1: Barclaycard Financial Results
Half-year ended
30.6.00 31.12.99 30.6.99




Total Income £523m £496m £472m
Total costs (£218m) (£202m) (£195m)
Provisions for bad and
doubtful debts
(£110m) (£88m) (£82m)
Operating profit £195m £206m £195m
Source Barclays Plc Interim Statement 2000
With around £4.8 billion pounds of credit card receivables in 1999, Barclaycard is required
to provide £480 million pounds of regulatory capital. So profits of £400 million a year
provide a return of close to 100% on equity, a vivid contrast with a British bank’s typical
return on equity (ROE) of 15% per annum. This is also an indication that, despite claims of
increased competition, credit cards remain a remarkably profitable component in a bank’s
portfolio. For instance, the profitability of the card business within  Citibank, the world’s
card market leader, is such that it has been estimated to be worth 50% more as a stand
alone business than the entire value of the bank.
Another element in the profit equation is the average value of balances settled outside the
"free interest period". If a customer settles early then the issuing bank will only earn
commission and fees (see table 2).  This provided an incentive for issuers to have customers
observing high interest earning balances outside the free interest period and indeed, Barclays
aims for individual customers to have at least 70% of interest earning balances outside the
free interest period. So in effect, card issuers provide medium term consumer finance. But to
be able to grow credit card balances profitably issuers must entertain the possibilities under
which credit risk might increase. For instance, in 2000 Barclaycard's transaction volume
grew by 12% while charges for bad and doubtful debts increased by 34%. Financial
performance thus suggests that the job for Barclaycard managers is finding customers who
need roll over credit but will not default on payments. Barclaycards in house skills in
measuring and monitoring credit risk are, therefore, crucial to their strategy.
Table 2: Credit Card Competitors (January 2001)
Issuer Type Fee Interest      Interest, % APR      Insurance Loyalty
P.A. Free days Debt Transfers days
1 Purchase Travel Scheme
2
Credit Cards11
Barclaycard V,M £10 56 19.4% 9.9%  60 100 days £50k Rewards
RBS Advanta V,M £0 56 17.9% 1.9% 365 0 £50k none
Goldfish V,M £0 52 18.9% 4.9% 180 0 £50k Goldfish
Egg V £0 45 11.9% 0.0% 180 30 days none Cashback
Tesco V £0 56 15.9% 3.9% 180 50 days £50k Clubcard
Smile V £0 46 12.9% 8.9% 365 0 £25k none
LloydsTSB(Adv) M £0 0 13.9% 9.9% a 0 none none
MBNA  V,M £0 59 16.9% 2.9% 180 100 days none none
HSBC V,M 0 56 18.9% 7.9% 180 0 £50k Choice
Amex blue Amex £12 56 19.5% 9.9%  a 90 days £50k Moneyback
GM V,M £0 52 19.9% 4.9% 180 0 £50k Rebates
Gold Cards
Barclaycard GoldV £10 56 19.4% 7.9%  60 100 days £100k Rewards
HSBC Gold V 0 56 14.9% 7.9% 180 90 days £100k none
1  The debt transfer rates and periods refer to the preferential rates offered to new customers with
debt balances brought across from a different card issuer.
2  Additional benefits such as purchase discounts, medical insurance, extended warranty and
personal liability are not included for reasons of space.
Table 2 also portrays how at the end of the millennium competition in UK credit card
markets has intensified and how customers encounter a wide ranging offer as compared to
Barclaycard’s premium priced cards. But a consequence of greater competition in retail
financial markets (and the credit card business in particular) is that the best creditworthy
customers have access to credit far more cheaply than the 20-25% charged by mainstream
card issuers. Hence, greater competition could have made it ever more difficult for credit
card transaction volumes to grow at high rates without issuers incurring in even higher
provisioning for bad and doubtful debts.
COMPETITION IN PAYMENTS
Barclaycards strategy in the card market has been associated with three continuing
elements. The first is the continued growth of the credit card market shown in table 3.  Over
the period 1989-1999 the volume of credit card transactions grew at 7.5%, while debit
cards grew at 40%.  The number of credit cards in use increased by 5% per annum and the
value of a transaction increased by 5.5% p.a.12
Table 3: Growth of transactions in the UK card market, 1989-1999
(Millions of Transactions per year)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Debit Card 68 192 359 522 659 808 1004 1270 1503 1736 2062
Credit & Charge
Cards
650 690 699 724 748 815 908 1025 1128 1224 1344
Store Cards 56 48 46 70 82 106 109 118 128 134 131
All Card
Purchases
774 930 1104 1316 1488 1723 2023 2413 2759 3094 3537
Cash issues by
card
918 1045 1112 1199 1277 1372 1512 1656 1809 1917 2025
Source www.apacs.com
The second factor is the relative success of Visa, whose UK franchise was exclusively
enjoyed by Barclaycard in the early years.  Over the years Visa secured a position as the
world's most widely used card, by 1998 accounting for $1.4 trillion dollars of purchases or
55% of the global market.  Although the competition between Visa and Mastercard was
less clear cut in the UK, Barclaycards Visa cards had international acceptability with 16
million merchants worldwide. Table 4 suggests that although Barclaycard lost market share
somewhat faster than the other major banks the strength of Visa’s international position to
some extent offset Barclaycards premium pricing.
Table 4: Cards issued by major banks and associated market shares
1994 % 1995 1996 1997 1998
e %
Barclays 8,464 37.2 8,944 9,273 9,429 9,561 29.4
Lloyds TSB 4,775 21.0 5,256 5,619 5,801 5,923 18.1
NatWest 3,556 15.6 3,654 3,834 4,502 4,655 14.1
Midland/HSBC 3,296 14.5 3,620 4,089 4,534 4,489 13.6
Total  bank credit
cards
22,692 25,216 27,455 31,829 32,793
Source :  Key Note – Credit & Other Finance Cards 1999, pp. 38
The third factor is the ability to avoid price competition by branding and by use of new
features supported by technology developments within the card networks. Although
MasterCard introduced their gold card in the US in 1981 and by 1992 there were similar
offerings in the UK (such as those supplied by American Express or the Co-operative
Bank), Barclaycard made an attempt with Barclaycard Gold until 1995. Barclaycard13
acquired 90,000 Gold customers and the launch pushed its market share of new credit
cards issued to over 30%. They also segmented their market, improving the retention of
profitable high borrowers with smaller required repayments and reduced rates for high
borrowings. Non-price features like extended purchase warranties and purchase insurance
were also added to the package for some cards.
With more than 1 billion cards issued  worldwide, credit  cards were becoming an
increasingly important form of payment in many countries. But the usage of debit and credit
cards issued in North America and Europe showed significant differences. The US
accounted for about 40% (400 million units) of the cards issued and a massive £340 billion
credit card spending in 1995. This compared with the UK's £44 billion and Italy's £6 billion.
While in some countries, such as France, debit cards and charge cards were dominant and
the credit card market was underdeveloped.
 Managers of Barclaycard then identified the unusually low penetration of credit cards in
Germany as a business opportunity and by 2000 they had issued 1.1 million cards in
Germany, France and Spain, with business growing at 10% per annum.  The potential for
continued growth in these markets is signalled by figures from the Credit Card Research
Group showing that credit card payments in the UK were equivalent to 8.5% of GDP while
in France, Germany and Italy the equivalent figure is 1%.
 Barclaycard also moved quickly into e-Commerce as the first UK credit card to offer
Internet account services with 250,000 cardholders registered to monitor their account
status on the Barclaycard website.
However and in spite of some card issuers been quick to grasp opportunities opened by
technological innovation, rather belatedly card issuers (and banks in particular) realised that
the same technology that supported retail credit cards could also support business to
business transactions. Europay is quoted as estimating that the European businesses spend
an annual £100 billion pounds on routine business expenses, mostly by cash or cheque.
Corporate cards, for travel and subsistence costs provide detailed reports and cost centre
consolidation. With a typical cost for paper based order processing and payment of $50
dollars and 50% of total procurement spend on orders under $400 dollars purchasing cards
provide a major opportunity to streamline purchasing procedures and save administration14
costs.  American Express launched their Corporate Purchasing Card in the US in 1993 and
in 1995 the UK, with Visa International introducing their corporate purchasing system to the
European market in 1994. Purchasing cards were attractive to business organisations by
allowing paperless “order to payment” purchasing, itemised transaction reports as well as
consolidated reports by employee, supplier and purchase category.
Barclays provided both company charge cards and purchasing cards under the  brand
Company Barclaycard and established UK market leadership in corporate charge cards.
Their four corporate cards, all Visa based, offer a combination of travel discounts and
insurance, extended purchase warranties and supplier discounts and provide reporting
options and VAT reporting. The Visa based Company Barclaycard Purchasing card allows
customers to nominate a monthly statement date and provides the option of extended credit
as well a the reporting options of the Company Barclaycard corporate card.  Barclays
leading position in this market was underlined by their success in securing the account for a
Government Procurement card with variants provided to the Ministry of Defence, Customs
and Excise, the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and the Environment Agency.
TRANSACTION PROCESSING
The transition from paper to electronics introduced large economies to scale in processing.
This innovation, however, characterised by relatively high level one-off investments. The
most expensive related to the linking of the point-of-sale system through leased lines and
satellites, as well as with investments to develop packet-switching systems to carry and
distribute messages across the network. Software, equipment and operating  staff, were
relatively independent of volume and so offered scale economies. Barclaycard implemented
the transition from paper to electronic processing using Barclaycard Services for card issue,
transaction processing and statement services. At the time Barcaycard’s share of total card
transactions in the UK was 27% and emerged from 9 million issued cards. This as opposed
to its   nearest rival Lloyds-TSB which had 5 million cardholders.
However, Barclaycard rejected the potentially profitable opportunity of servicing other card
issuers through Barclaycard Services. Although others, including Bank of Scotland, Royal
Bank of Scotland and NatWest were active in supporting own brand cards. These cards15
were issued by retail chains, building societies and smaller banks who reasoned they could
narrow their scale disadvantage by gaining incremental processing volume. The processing
area was further complicated by the entry in the UK market of card issuers such as MBNA,
whose 16 million cardholders in the US clearly out-scaled Barclays.
Increasingly, though, processing is determined by the two dominant card networks. Visa’s
network, VisaNet, has a peak throughput of 2,700 transactions while MasterCard used
AT&T to replace its transaction network infrastructure with the industry's first virtual private
network. Technology improvements provided new opportunities for Barclaycard to save
costs and in 1998 a change programme identified ways to eliminate 1,100 jobs over the
following 3 years.  Results were already evident by 1999 when costs fell by 4% to $397
million dollars despite the continued expansion of Barclaycard activity in Europe and
especially in Germany.
All card issuers though are faced with some major changes as magnetic stripe cards give
way to smart or chip cards which can store transaction data without needing to access the
complex networks required to handle credit cards.  Visa member banks have already issued
23 million chip cards in the market today while e-commerce transactions are being
supported by Visa’s Secure Electronic Transaction platform.  At the same time, Mastercard
bought an interest in the Mondex, the smart card based electronic wallet developed by
NatWest Bank.
The on board chip in smart cards can handle complex security features including biometrics,
which reduces card delinquency for banks switching to the new technology.  But greater
security allows credit transfers to be made direct to merchants over the telephone or
Internet without the need for processing by either the cardholder’s or merchant’s bank.
Furthermore, V-Sync, a Japanese digital content provider has developed a matchbox sized
device, CoCyph, that turns a mobile phone into a payment mechanism by a device that can
scan store and transaction details, then confirm payment from a digital account through a
terminal at the supplier which at $200 dollars per unit costs one tenth of a conventional on-
line terminal. This process deprives card processors and suppliers of the personal
information they routinely obtain in a card based transaction. At the same time, chip cards
will support multiple relationships. So the strength of banks links with their customers will be16
tested by many other business such as utility companies and petrol companies who have
frequent contact with their customers and can offer direct incentives for customers to take
their card rather than the banks’ card.
Technological change and the open nature of the main networks thus attracted a plethora of
competitors into credit card markets. But even with a flood of new entrants in the mid-
1990’s Barclaycard kept defection rates below 5% per annum.  Defection rates were low
thanks to the inertia of bank customers which has been historically high. Even for credit
cards where the formalities of changing suppliers are minimal customer retention rates have
also been high historically. However, acquisition of new customers was a different story with
Barclaycards share dropping to 15%, well below their ongoing market share of 30% of the
market. Figure 2 further illustrates how processing specialists such as MBNA or Royal
Bank of Scotland have gained ground at the expense of participants which had grown
organically while issuing cards to their own customer base.
Figure 2: Market share estimates





















































Figure 3:  Changes in outstanding balances in the UK credit card market
Source : Card Forum International, Jan/Feb 2000, pp. 51
Figure 3 depicts how competition intensified as a rash of new competitors, including non-
bank issuers moved into the market, with variable success. But many of the new entrants
found that customers acquired through intensive promotion of discount offers often move on
once the offer ends.  Nevertheless, free for life offers from the Co-operative Bank for its
Gold Card or Halifax for a Platinum card offering purchase protection, travel insurance,
help-line and a 2.9% APR on transferred balances offer large savings against even a
standard Barclaycard.  As a senior executive at one card issuer remarked,
‘…The main barrier for a new credit card providers is the fragmented nature of the
business and the present focus on rate driven offers. Rates below the cost of funds
are not sustainable but unless offers are competitive, it is difficult to achieve market
share growth…’
Affinity and co-branded cards also entered the market.  Arrangements such as NatWest’s
‘air miles’ offer, HFC Bank’s GM card and Barclaycards ventures with Cellnet, Eastern
Electricity and Natural Gas involve revenue sharing between the affinity group and the card
issuer.  Nevertheless British Gas’s Goldfish card (launched with HFC Bank in 1996) was
picking up 7.5% of new cards (against Barclaycards 15%) within 2 years, while MBNA,
after entering in 1994, won 5% of the national card base by 1998, on the back of a massive






























direct mail operation. Table 5 and figure 2 summarise the types of established and new
participants in the market and their effect on Barclaycard’s market share.
Table 5:  New players in the UK credit card market in the 1990s
Type of players New Players in the UK market
1 Foreign entrants American Express, Citibank, MBNA , HFC,  Capital One, Bank
One, Peoples Bank and The Associates
2 Non-financial
institutions
Virgin, General Motors (GM) card, AT&T Universal Card
4 Specialist credit card
issuers
MBNA, Capital One, and Household International
5 Retailers card and
Store cards
Tesco and Sainsbury, Marks & Spencer (branded loyalty card
products)
6 Internet based card
suppliers
Egg , Marbles, Smile, Cahoot
The entry of non-banks into the card business has been helped by the technical support of
established card processors. The cost of establishing banks like Sainsbury’s Bank (Bank of
Scotland), or Royal Bank of Scotland’s Virgin and Tesco financial operations is less than
£40 million pounds, with Prudential Insurance’s Egg at £200 million the exception.
Supporting customers through cards, call centres and the Internet allows these new entrants
to offer cut throat rates on their products.
BARCLAYCARD'S STRATEGY
Barclaycard's strategy was to develop and maintain market leadership by differentiating its
product using the comprehensive benefits package described in table 6. As its operated
semi-autonomously within the Barclays group, managers of Barclaycard could also market
its products as a unique service. This differentiated Barclaycard from other high street bank
credit cards that were sold as another feature of the bank's service.
Barclaycard did not compete on price - its interest charges (APR) were not the lowest on
offer. It had invested heavily in an energetic and sustained promotion/advertising campaign.
Barclaycard's investment in advertising exceeded that of all other companies in the industry.
For example, in 1995/6 it spent over £12 million compared with NatWest's £1.5 million and
American Express's £3 million. Few in the UK will not be familiar with the long-running
television advertisement series featuring Rowan Atkinson (a.k.a. Mr Bean). The message in19
the advertising encapsulated the essence of Barclaycard's strategy and how it planned to
differentiate itself from competitors. The advertisements emphasised peace of mind - in case
of an emergency such as losing your card or passport, medical problems on holiday or
losing goods purchased with Barclaycard. It underlined the benefits package of support
provided by Barclaycard. It also capitalised on its strong customer base by relationship
marketing alliances with leading organisations in other service industries such as BT and
Cellnet (telecommunications) and Marks and Spencer and J. Sainsbury (retailing).
Table 6: Barclaycard products and services, 1998
￿ Credit cards •  Standard credit cards: Visa and
MasterCard
•  Special privilege cards: Barclaycard Gold,
Barclaycard Premier, Company
Barclaycard
•  Barclaycard Sense: For consumers new to
credit cards
￿ Free user benefits •  Barclaycard purchase cover: 100 days of
free insurance
•  Barclaycard holiday club: Discounts for
over 80 tour operators; free travel accident
insurance
•  Barclaycard Profiles: 'Reward points' to be
collected for gifts or cash
￿ Advice •  International rescue: Cash advances,
advice or local doctors, etc.
•  Barclaycard assist: advice on legal, home
or roadside assistance
￿ On-line services •  Barclaycard Call Service: Direct debiting
for calls worldwide
•  Barclaycard Netlink: On-line banking
services (Internet)
In such a fast-moving and competitive industry there were many opportunities for all
competitors to develop. It was important that Barclaycard was clear which of the various
options it should itself pursue. In 1998 Barclaycard was the subject of an  MBA student
project at Cranfield School of Management in the UK. The results are described in exhibit 1
and should help you formulate, evaluate and compare a range of strategic options and to20
choose the best way forward for Barclaycard.21
Exhibit 1: SWOT for BARCLAYCARD
In 1998 Barclaycard was the subject of an MBA student project at Cranfield School of
Management in the UK. The student groups produced detailed analyses of Barclaycard's
strategic position, summarised as a SWOT analysis.
The strengths of Barclaycard were:
•  Market leadership with a market share of 34 per cent in terms of credit cards issued,
and 27 per cent in terms of transaction value provided the company with a strong
financial base.
•  Low-cost production, resulting from accumulated experience as the first credit card
issuer in the UK and economies of scale derived from its high market share. However,
this was being rapidly eroded.
•  Brand status, the Barclaycard name was almost a generic term for a credit card and was
widely recognised by consumers.
•  A well established distribution network, through Barclays Bank and other members of
Barclays plc, other financial institutions and large retail organisations which made its
product available to a wide range of potential customers.
•  Information technology capability, which allowed  Barcalycard to  develop improved
products through alliances with companies such as British Telecom and Cellnet.
However, Barclaycard had at least two weaknesses:
•  The annual transaction value per card of £1,719 was low in comparison with NatWest's
figure of £2,121.
•  Its typical APR of 25% was twice or even three times larger than the interest rate
offered by new competitors. Although defection rates were low, average transaction
value was at risk of dropping further.22
In the late 1990s there appeared to be a number of possible opportunities for Barclaycard:
• Spending on credit and debit cards amounted to 43 per cent of total retail sales,
leaving scope for further development.
• Only 54% of UK adults owned credit cards, leaving room for increased market
penetration.
• Technological developments and new products would improve security and
flexibility of payment by plastic systems.
• Company branded cards and store cards provided access to a base of new users
and the opportunity to develop loyalty based ties. This could enable further
marketing of discounts, new products, etc. Company cards also provided an
opportunity to expand into the charge card market for business customers.
• The short-term macroeconomic situation in the UK was encouraging, with real
income increasing, low inflation and strong economic growth. The expansion in the
credit card industry was expected to continue in the foreseeable future.
However there appeared to be a number of threats:
• New entrants such as building  societiesand non-bank providers offering similar
products.
• Low APR cards were being offered by some new entrants. This included some
American banks that were used to operating in a home market where APR had
been driven down by 'no frills' operators who had continued to gain market share.
• The cannibalisation of the credit card market by debit cards and electronic purse
(smart) cards.
• Increased availability of other forms of credit, e.g. point-of-sale interest-free credit.
• Increased opportunities for potential card fraud.
• Reliance on electronic communications - the effect of a major breakdown in national
communications (e.g. a strike at British Telecom) could be catastrophic.23
_______________
DISCLAIMER
This case aims to foster class discussion rather than illustrate good or bad management. It
was originally prepared by Kevan Scholes based on  projects of MBA students at Cranfield
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MERCHANT RETAILER
Nearly £85 billion was
spent by customers in
1996 on plastic cards -
£48 billion on credit
cards and £37 billion on
debit cards
Figure 1: The five players in the plastic card game
Source: Adapted from The 1997 Guide to Barclays Merchant Services